RECENT CASES
Bills and Notes-Joint and Several Obligation-[lllinois].-A promissory note was,
by its terms, joint and several. The second paragraph of the note provided" ...
the
makers and all endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment ....
and
....
authority is hereby irrevocably given to any attorney of any court of record
....
[to] confess judgment against the undersigned .... " The note was signed by
two persons and judgment was confessed against one of the two signers. Held, the
warrant of attorney, like the note itself, was several as well as joint, and judgment was
properly confessed against one of the two signers. Farmer'sExchange Bank of Elvaston
v. Sollars, 353 Il. 224, 187 N.E. 289 (1033).
The power to confess a judgment must be clearly given and strictly pursued, and if
power is given to confess judgment against the promisors jointly, a confession of judgment against one severally will render the confession and judgment on it void. Keen
v. Bump, 286 M. 1i, 121 N.E. 251 (1918), W1ells v. DurstChevrolet Co., 341 Ill. 1O8, 173
N.E. 92 (193-). Apparently the Illinois statute requiring that "all joint obligations and
covenants shall be taken and held to be joint and several obligations and covenants"
does not apply to confessions of judgment. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 76, § 3;
see Keen v. Bump, 286 Ill. 1i, 121 N.E. 251 (1918). That a note is in terms joint and
several will not authorize a several judgment against one of the makers on a joint confession of judgment clause. Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61 N.E. 416 (ioil).
In Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61 N.E. 416 (igol) the confession of judgment was
held joint where the language of the confession was "we authorize," even though the
note was joint and several. The court distinguished the present case from the Mayer
case because of the use of the words "the undersigned" (which might refer to each
signer) in the confession clause, and of the word "severally" in the preceding waiver of
presentment clause.
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Certiorari-Scope of Review-Revocation of Medical License-[llinois].-Proceedings were instituted under the Medical Practice Act, Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat.
(1933), c. 91, § 16a(3), to revoke the defendant's license to practice medicine, charging
him with gross malpractice, resulting in the permanent injury of a patient. Certiorari
to review an order of the Medical Committee revoking defendant's license was quashed,
and defendant appealed. Held, reversed and remanded, on the ground that the committee in making its order had adopted an erroneous rule of law. Schireson v. Walsh,
354 IMl. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1933).
Briefs filed in the case reveal that the record brought up contained findings by a
committee of physicians that the patient was diagnosed for bow legs by means of a
photograph, despite the fact that the only proper method of diagnosis was by X-ray or
fluoroscope; that even the photograph did not reveal a case of bow legs; yet the'defendant performed an unnecessary operation, which eventually necessitated the amputation of both legs. In finding the defendant guilty as charged, the committee applied
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